市场规模、范围经济与供应链聚集可能性

Market size,scope economies and supply chain clustering possibility

将供应链聚集看作多客户外包的结果,建立一个两客户"自制-外包"决策博弈模型,即两个企业各自独立做出是否将生产外包给一个拥有相同生产技术但存在范围经济的承包商.对均衡条件的分析表明,当范围经济程度与市场规模的比值达到一定程度时,两客户均做出外包决策是一个纳什均衡,从而多客户集体外包(供应链聚集)成为可能.当这一比值进一步增大,供应链聚集下的产品市场价格要低于厂商各自独立进行生产时的产品市场价格.由于可能存在巨额内部交易成本,使得三者一体化不是一个必然的最优结果.这些结果一方面给出了供应链聚集的一个替代原因,另一方面也可用来解释"中国价格"这一广泛观察到的现象.

Taking the view that supply chain clusters result from multi-client outsourcing decisions, this paper builds a game model where two clients are to make make-or-buy decisions, namely, two firms decide independently whether to outsource their production functions to a supplier whose production technology, except the existence of scope economies, is the same as the two firms＇ The analyses on the equilibrium conditions show that the strategy profile where both firms choose outsourcing is a Nash equilibrium when ratios of scope economies to market size reach some critical values. This implies the possibility of multi-clients outsourcing （ supply chain cluster） if those ratios are high enough. When the ratios increase further, the market prices in the case of supply chain cluster will be less than those in the case of independently self-making. Because huge internal transaction cost is possible, three firms＇ integration is not the necessary prediction. These results give an alternative account for the emerging of supply chain clusters on one hand, and on the other hand, they can be used to explain the widely observed phenomenon of the China price.