摘要
本文以2005年1月1日~2008年12月31日公布股权激励计划草案的公司为样本,研究我国上市公司设计的股权激励方案的特征及其激励效应。我们发现,上市公司设计的股权激励方案既存在激励效应又存在福利效应。我们认为,上市公司可以通过激励条件和激励有效期的改善,来增加股权激励方案的激励效果。激励型公司和福利型公司存在差异的原因在于公司治理结构安排。本文以泸州老窖的股权激励方案为例,提出了如何设计合理股权激励方案的建议。本研究的贡献在于首次系统地总结我国上市公司股权激励方案的总体特征,并根据标准区分激励型和福利型公司,为监管层的进一步监管和上市公司推出股权激励方案提供参考。
Taking as samples the companies that announced in the period from the first of January,2005 to the 31st of December,2008,their drafts of stock option and purchase plans for stimulation(SOAPPFS),we have studied the characteristics and the stimulation effect of SOAPPFS.We have discovered that there exist both stimulation effect and welfare effect in SOAPPFS designed by listed companies.In our opinion,listed companies can increase the incentive effect of SOAPPFS through the improvement of incentive conditions and the validity period of stimulation.The cause for the difference between the incentive-driven companies and the welfare-driven companies lies in the structure of corporate governance.Taking as a case the SOAPPFS made by the company of Luzhou Laojiao,we have offered some suggestions about how to reasonably devise SOAPPFS.The contributions of this article are that the overall characteristics of SOAPPFS of China's companies are,for the first time,systematically summed up and that advisory opinions are offered,according to the standard classification in distinguishing incentive-driven firms from welfare-driven firms,on further supervision carried out by relative supervisors and on listed companies' formulation of SOAPPFS.
出处
《管理世界》
CSSCI
北大核心
2009年第9期133-147,共15页
Journal of Management World
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(70872022
70632002)
上海市哲学社会基金(2008BJB021)
教育部人文社科规划基金项目(06JA630016)的资助