期刊文献+

专利制度的运行机制及其合理性 被引量:3

The Operative Organism and the Rationality of Patent System
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摘要 文章简要地描述和分析了专利制度的基本运行机制,表明专利制度具有一个内容丰富的政策"工具箱",其中包括保护期限、保护宽度等。就其本质而言,专利可以看作计划者向潜在创新者提供的"机密交换契约",其市场价值随市场范围的增加而增加,它以法律手段解决了商业机密模式下创新知识的可占有性与累积性之间的内在矛盾。 The patent system has a very versatile policy toolbox, including statutory length, breadth, renewal system, etc. Patent, in its nature, is an exchange-for-secret contract that social planner supply to potential innovators. Its market value is highly uncertain and closely dependent on market scope. The ra- tionale of patent system is that, by strengthening R&D incentives and encouraging information disclosure, it solves the intrinsic conflicts between the appropriability and accumulativeness of innovation knowledge.
作者 寇宗来 石磊
出处 《复旦学报(社会科学版)》 CSSCI 北大核心 2009年第5期109-115,123,共8页 Fudan Journal(Social Sciences)
基金 教育部基地项目"累积创新和开放经济下中国的最优专利政策"(项目批准号:2007JJD790120) 复旦大学"中国经济国际竞争力"985研究项目 "上海市重点学科建设项目"(项目批准号:B101)的资助
关键词 专利制度 机密交换契约 创新激励 信息披露 patent system exchange-for-secret contract R&D incentive information disclosure
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参考文献14

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同被引文献36

  • 1唐要家,孙路.专利转化中的“专利沉睡”及其治理分析[J].中国软科学,2006(8):73-78. 被引量:51
  • 2孔祥浩.高校科技成果转化战略研究[J].科学与管理,2006,26(5):64-66. 被引量:6
  • 3张学军.农业科技成果转化若干理论问题探析——基于新制度经济学视角[J].中国科技论坛,2007(5):118-121. 被引量:18
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  • 5Z. Grilliches, "Issues in Assessing the Contribution of Research and Development to Productivity Growth,"Bell Journal of Economics 10.1 (1979) : 92 -116.
  • 6P.M. Romer, "New Goods, Old Theory and the Welfare Costs of Trade Re- strictions," Journal of Development Economics 43.1 ( 1994 ) : 5 - 38.
  • 7J. Tirole, "Incomplete Contracts : Where DoWe Stand?" Econometrica 67.4 (1999) :741 -781.
  • 8B.D. Wright, "The Economics of Invention Incentives: Patents, Prizes, and Research Contracts," American Economic Review 73.4 ( 1983 ) : 691 - 707.
  • 9E. A. A. de Laat, "Patents or Prizes : Monopolistic R&D and Asymmetric Information," International Journal of Industrial Organization 15.3 ( 1997 ) :369 - 390.
  • 10M. Kremer, "Pa- tent Buyouts : A Mechanism for Encouraging Innovation," Quarterly Journal of Economics 113.4 ( 1998 ) : 1137 - 1167.

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