农村金融监管中的博弈行为分析

Analysis on Game Behavior in Rural Financial Supervision

针对我国农村金融体系中存在的违规现象及蕴含的风险隐患,本文运用博弈论方法剖析了农村金融监管中的策略性行为。监管部门和农村金融机构构成博弈的参与方,在各自利益的驱使下,通过相互博弈形成稳定的纳什均衡解。运用比较静态方法进一步得出影响博弈均衡的诸多因素及作用方向。最后,基于博弈分析结果提出实施有效监管的相关政策建议。

In view of contrary phenomenon and hidden risks existing in rural financial system in China,this paper analyzes the strategic behaviors in rural fiancial supervision. Supervisory department and rural financial organization constitute two sides of the game. They are prompted by their individual benefit, so the game forms stable Nash equilibrium solution through mutual games. And it further analyzes the factors influencing the game equilibrium by using comparative static method. Finally,it puts forward some suggestions based on the analysis results.