期刊文献+

我国企业年金投资风险管理机制的再设计 被引量:2

Redesign of China's Corporate Pension Risk Compensation Mechanism
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摘要 作为补充养老金的企业年金,对安全性有着特殊的要求,建立合理的风险补偿机制对维护企业年金参与员工利益、保证企业年金的健康发展具有重要意义。本文将美国对冲基金中的高水位线(HWM)条款与我国资产管理市场上现行类似HWM的管理费条款进行了比较,提出在我国企业年金投资管理市场中引入HWM条款、改良企业年金投资人管理费的制度建议。本文进一步把HWM条款和我国企业年金的风险准备金制度进行了比较,提出将两者结合起来构建更为合理完善的企业年金风险补偿机制的政策建议。 As the second pillar of social security system, enterprise pension funds have special requirements on investment safe. So establishing a rational risk compensation mechanism will be important to all of the pension funds benefits and ensure the healthy development of enterprise pension funds. This paper compares HWM of hedge funds in the United States with similar fee structure used in China, and suggests that the modified HWM should be intro- duced to the management of Chinese enterprise pension funds, so as to improve the fee structure of pension funds managers. Moreover, by comparing HWM and risk reserve in pension fund, it is concluded that combining both of them is reasonable to perfect compensation mechanism of enterprise pension fund risk.
作者 李曜 史丹丹
出处 《上海金融》 CSSCI 北大核心 2009年第9期22-26,共5页 Shanghai Finance
基金 国家自然科学基金项目(70573067)"新形势下我国企业年金的治理结构 投资与风险管理研究" 上海财经大学211三期项目的阶段成果
关键词 HWM条款 企业年金 风险补偿机制 High Water Marks Enterprise Annuity Compensation Mechanism
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参考文献8

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二级参考文献17

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