摘要
提出协调供应链的新机制——信用期激励机制;阐明信用期激励机制的融资作用及外部性特点.当零售商面临资金约束时,制造商通过提供基于采购量的交易信用向零售商融资,进而实现供应链的协调.在多产品背景下,信用期激励机制还体现出正外部性特点,即某一产品的信用期政策能够增加其他产品的采购量和其他产品制造商的利润.在关于零售商的资金约束与制造商的资金成本存在双边不完全信息时,通过双边拍卖模型给出了均衡的信用期长度与双方市场势力及信息结构的关系,数值算例验证了文章结论.
A new supply chain coordination mechanism, saying trade credit, is proposed and the financing and external characteristics of this new mechanism are illustrated. Given the retailer's budget constraint, the manufacturer can use trade credit as a financing means to coordinate the supply chain. And the external characteristic of trade credit mechanism, which is the effect of one product manufacturer's trade credit in enhancing other products' order sizes and expected profit, is addressed under multiple products context. When there's bilateral asymmetric information about retailer's budget constraint and the manu- facturer's capital cost, the double auction model is used to analyze the influence of information structure and bargaining power on the length of trade credit. Numerical example is used to illustrate the conclusions of the paper.
出处
《系统工程理论与实践》
EI
CSCD
北大核心
2009年第9期32-40,共9页
Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice
基金
国家自然科学基金(70572101
70732003)
关键词
信用期
融资
双边不完全信息
供应链协调
trade credit
financing
bilateral information asymmetry
supply chain