摘要
我国公共池塘资源采取了"利维坦"式管理体制,但这一管理体制由于产权方面存在的所有权代理悖论和公有产权体制下私人产权保障性不强的问题而出现了失灵。我国公有产权对私人产权的体制性排他违背了公共池塘资源本身的混合性自然产权,即归属上的共有性和使用中的私益性并存。基于此,在我国社会主义公有制下,通过产权交易制度将公共部门和私人部门获取、支配和使用公共池塘资源的过程和行为法制化和规范化,或许不失为我国公共池塘资源治理的有效路径之一。
As for the management of CPR, Chinese government adopts the system of Leviathan, but the "Leviathan" system falls into failure for two reasons concerning property rights: the paradox of proprietary rights' deputing and lack of effective protection for personal rights under the public property rights institution. In fact, that the public property rights institutionally excludes the personal property rights is in contravention of CPR's natural property attribute of combination, namely the co-existing of common property and private interest in use. Based on this recognition and on the premise of socialist public ownership, it may be an effective path for the governance of CPR in our country to establish property rights transaction institution for regulating and legalizing beth public sector and private sector's acquisition and usage of CPR.
出处
《改革》
CSSCI
北大核心
2009年第10期131-135,共5页
Reform
基金
国家社会科学基金项目"乡镇基层政府的公共服务供给能力评估和建设研究"(批准号:08CZZ016)
关键词
公共池塘资源
共有产权
私用产权
产权交易
common pool resources, common property, private property in use,property rights transaction