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基于委托—代理理论的公共旅游资源管理制度分析 被引量:3

Analysis of State-owned Tourism Resource Administrative System Based on the Principal-Agent Theory
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摘要 中国公共旅游资源管理的委托代理层次较多,代理链较长,加之政府作为委托人和代理人的双重身份,使得公共旅游资源的管理过程中,不但存在"代理问题",而且存在"委托问题"。借鉴委托代理理论,从规范公共旅游资源管理中的代理关系出发,对完善公共旅游资源代理制度,促进公共旅游资源的可持续利用,改进公共旅游资源的管理提出了一些建议和措施。 State-owned tourism resource administration in China involves many different administrative levels of principals and agents,and usually with a long agent chain.Governments both act as principal and agent,therefore in the process of state-owned tourism resource administration,principal and agent are problematic.Based on the principal-agent theory,the standardization of the principal and agent relationship in state-owned tourism resource administration is analyzed.Some suggestions and solutions are also put forward to improve the related agent system, boost the sustainable development of state-owned tourism resources as well as the administrative ability.
出处 《旅游论坛》 CSSCI 2009年第4期509-512,共4页 Tourism Forum
关键词 公共旅游资源 管理制度 委托代理理论 委托代理问题 state-owned tourism resources administrative system principal-agent theory principal-agent problem
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