摘要
实证研究表明,虽然变更审计师增加了上市公司年报被出具非标准审计意见和审计意见恶化的可能性,但是审计师变更更为显著地提高了审计意见改善的可能性;审计收费异常增加与被出具非标准审计意见和审计意见恶化的可能性负相关。公司管理层在一定程度上可以成功实现审计意见购买的动机。此外,异常审计收费、审计收费异常增加和异常降低与审计师变更之间不存在显著的交互效应。
Empirical analyses indicate that auditor switching increase the likelihood of receiving modified audit opinions and deteriorating audit opinions of annual financial reports, however it much more significantly increase the possibility of the improvement of unfavorable audit opinions; and abnormal increase of audit fees is negatively related with the likelihood of receiving modified audit opinions and deteriorating audit opinions, which both imply that management of Chinese listed companies to some extent can realize the motivation of audit opinion shopping. Besides, there isn' t significant interaction effect between auditor switching and abnormal audit fees. abnormal increase or decrease of audit fees.
出处
《财经理论与实践》
CSSCI
北大核心
2009年第5期57-61,共5页
The Theory and Practice of Finance and Economics
基金
上海市哲学社会科学规划青年课题(2008EJB002)
上海市教育发展基金会晨光计划项目(2008CG09)
复旦大学青年科学基金项目
关键词
异常审计收费
审计意见购买
审计师变更
交互效应
Abnormal Audit Fees
Audit Opinion Shopping
Auditor Switching
Interaction Effect