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国外股权激励与经营者信息披露研究综述 被引量:5

Equity-based Incentives and Information Disclosure:A Review of Foreign Scholars' Research
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摘要 近年来,国外的学者对股权激励与经营者信息披露问题进行了理论研究,同时也实证了国外上市公司股权激励与经营者信息披露之间的关系。随着美国上市公司财务舞弊案频频曝光,股权激励的负面效应已逐渐引起了国外学者的关注。通过对国外研究股权激励与经营者信息披露关系的理论与实证文献进行综述,可为国内研究股权激励效果的学者及政策制定者提供参考。 Recently, foreign scholars have demonstrated equity - based incentives can result in information manipulation theoretically, and also studied the relationship between equity - based incentives and information disclosure empirically. With the emergency of corporate financial fraud in the United States, the side effect of equity - based incentives has been concerned by foreign scholars. In this paper, we provide a survey of the literatures which study the relationship between equity -based incentives and information disclosure. This may offer a reference for domestic scholars who study the side effect of equity - based incentives and policy makers.
出处 《商业研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2009年第10期31-34,共4页 Commercial Research
关键词 股权激励 信息披露 综述 equity - based incentives information disclosure review
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