我国农地制度改革的双层次互动进化博弈模型分析

Rural Land Tenure Reform in China:Analysis through Double-level Interaction Evolutionary Game Model

文章分析我国农地制度改革过程中中央政府、地方政府和农民之间的双层次互动进化博弈关系,探讨三个主体的行为和策略选择特征,为我国农地制度改革提供理论依据。研究认为,我国农地制度改革本质上是通过宏观层次的"选择"和微观层次的"突变"而逐步达成进化博弈均衡的动态过程。为了顺利推进我国农地制度改革,需要解决三个方面的问题:同时兼顾三个主体的利益;保证宏观"选择"机制的健全;鼓励微观层次的"突变"。

The process of land reform is a game among central and local government and peasant. It is a repetitive game and can be classified into the games of Macro and Micro levels. The paper analyses the process through double-level interaction evolutionary game model, the completion of which is a process of macro level ＂selection＂ and micro ＂mutation＂. On the basis, we can obtain three revelations about rural land tenure reform in China.