摘要
文章主要讨论制度变迁过程中那些无效率的制度均衡是如何形成的。在对利益集团经济行为进行分析的基础上,主要考察了Davis和North理论意义上的第一和第二行动集团在制度变迁中的作用。研究表明,由于利益集团自身利益与社会利益之间存在着冲突,因此即使是启动和推进制度变迁过程的第一和第二行动集团,也有可能妨碍制度变迁达至最优点,使其掉入"陷阱"之中。
The paper mainly discusses the formation of the inefficient institutional equilibrium in the process of institutional changes. Based on the analysis of the economic behaviours of interest groups, it studies the effects of the first-action groups and the second-action groups of the theory of Davis and North on the institutional changes. The results indicate that, owing to the conflict of interests between the interest groups and the society, even the first-action groups and the second-action groups which start and promote the process of institutional changes may hinder the institutional changes from realizing the optimization, leading to the institutional snare.
出处
《财经研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2009年第10期14-25,104,共13页
Journal of Finance and Economics
基金
国家社会科学基金重点项目(08AJL002)
关键词
利益集团
制度变迁
制度陷阱
转型的合法性
interest groups
institutional changes
institutional snare
the legitimacy of transition