PPP合作中控制权配置及其对合作效率影响的理论和实证研究——以中国医疗卫生领域内的PPP合作为例被引量：22

A Theoretical and Empirical Study of Allocation of Control Rights and Its Influence towards the Cooperation Efficiency in PPP——Exemplified by PPPs in China's medical and health fields

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摘要本文以中国医疗卫生领域内的制药企业与非营利组织进行PPP合作为背景,运用不完全契约理论研究制药企业与非营利组织合作中的控制权配置及其对合作效率影响的研究。本文首先通过构建控制权配置对合作效率影响的数学模型,并在模型推导的基础上提出了基本研究假设,进一步地对研究假设进行实证检验。研究结果表明,控制权配置会影响PPP合作中的企业的自利性投入和公益性投入水平,合理的控制权配置一方面能够保证企业选择较低的自利性投入和较高的公益性投入满足企业的激励相容条件,另外一方面也能够提高PPP合作效率。 Based on the background of PPPs in medical and health fields in China, this paper uses the incomplete contract theory to study the allocation of control fights that the pharmaceutical enterprises have cooperation with the non-profit organizations and its influence towards the cooperation efficiency. Firstly this paper establishes the mathematical model of the allocation of control fights and its influence towards the cooperation efficiency, and points out the basic research hypotheses; furthermore this paper conduct an empirical test to these hypotheses. The results show that the allocation of control rights does have an influence on the self-interest investment and the public-interest investment of the enterprises in PPP. On the one hand, the proper allocation of control fights will ensure the enterprises to choose the less self-interest investment and more public-interest investment to satisfy the condition of incentive compatibility. On the other hand it can enhance the PPP＇s efficiency.

作者张喆贾明万迪昉

机构地区西安交通大学管理学院西北工业大学管理学院

出处《管理评论》 CSSCI 北大核心 2009年第9期29-38,共10页 Management Review

基金西安交通大学校内基金项目资助(08140005) 西安交通大学"985工程"二期项目资助(07200701)

关键词制药企业 PPP合作控制权配置合作效率 pharmaceutical enterprises, PPP, allocation of control fights, cooperation efficiency

分类号 F283 [经济管理—国民经济]

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