阻止合谋的“囚徒困境”博弈分析:对国企监管的启示

Game Analysis of the Prisoner's Dilemma to Deter Collusion:An Inspiration for State-owned Enterprise's Supervision

在Kofman和Lawarree(1996)提出的防范合谋的囚徒困境模型基础上,笔者分析了不同生产率经营者的合谋行为,得出:以ε∈(0,1)的概率派出第二个审计师、强化刚性法律的"硬约束"和完善审计师的激励机制,可以阻止审计合谋。同时还得出:委托人对经营者类型的判断对防范合谋的效果起决定作用,对审计师的奖励必须在一个合理的限度内,才能保证审计师和经营者的行为向预期方向发展,否则将无法阻止合谋;审计师的道德约束、风险厌恶有助于防止审计合谋,而国有企业监管者在阻止审计合谋中,可以发挥同企业真实所有者一样的作用,这为国资部门对国有企业实行审计公开招标和抽查复审提供了理论支持。

I analyzed the different productive manager＇s collusive behavior on the basis of prisoner＇s dilemma model to prevent collusion presented by Kofman and Lawarree （1996） . I conclude the measures sending the second auditor with probability ε ∈ （0,1）, enforcing the lawful rigidity and perfecting reward mechanism can prevent audit collusion. I also conclude the principal＇s judge about the manager＇s type play a decisive role on collusion deterring. The reward to auditor must be bounded in a reasonable scope, can the behavior of manager and auditor develop in expected way. Otherwise the collusion can＇t be prevented. Another conclusion is the auditor＇s ethical constraint and risk dislike do good to prevent collusion and the supervisor on national enterprise can play the same effects in deter audit collusion as the real owner of the enterprise. It provides theory support for the state-owned assets supervision and administration commission of the state council to put the publicly audit bidding and random double audit into practice.