寡占市场中零售商购买势力、纵向限制与社会福利研究——以家电连锁零售企业的竞争为例

Toward Oligopolistic Power of Retailers,Vertical Restraints and Social Welfare——A Case with Household Appliance Retail Chains

连锁企业的购买势力是影响竞争行为与格局的重要因素,通过构建三阶段"古诺"竞争模型,对我国家电零售业竞争格局的形成及其对上游产业所产生的影响展开分析。并在此基础上,进一步研究社会福利水平将会如何变化。研究发现,只要寡头连锁企业之间不存在横向的合谋,购买势力的存在并不会导致零售市场产品价格的升高;零售企业会向上游企业施加价格压力,但这种价格压力并不会必然会完全转化为零售企业的利润;只要市场的零售企业不是独断,适度追求市场占有率的竞争会提高社会福利和企业利润,有益于产业健康发展。但是,过度追求市场占有率的竞争最终会导致恶性竞争,导致社会福利的下降,产业的发展也会受到损害。

This paper analyzes the competition and its impact on upstream of China's household appliance retailing based on constructing a three stage 'Cournot' model. The results show that buyers' power would not result in retailing price increase as long as oligopolistic chains have no collaboration,that retailers would give upstream firms price pressure which would not necessarily lead to larger retailing margin,that market share competition helps enhance social welfare and corporate margin with no monopoly involved.