2Holmstrom B.Moral hazard in teams[].The Bell Journal of Economics.1982
3Rayo,Luis.Relational Incentives and Moral Hazard in Teams[].The Review of Economic Studies.2007
二级参考文献44
1Jensen, Michael and K Murphy. "Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives", Journal of Political Economy, 1990, 98, 225-264.
2Jeon, Seonghoon. "Moral Hazard and Reputational Concerns in Teams: Implications for Organizational Choice", International Journal of Industrial Organization, 1996, 14, 297-315.
3Jeon, Seonghoon."Reputational Concerns and Managerial Incentives in Investment Decisions", European Economic Review, 1998, 42(7), 1203-1229.
4Jewitt, Ian. "Information and Principal-Agent Problems", unpublished manuscript, University of Bristol, 1999.
5Kim, S. "Efficiency of an Information System in an Agency Model", Econometrica, 1995, 10, 74-91.
6Laband, David and M Piette. "Team Production in Economics: Division of Labor or Mentoring",Labour Economics, 1995, 2, 33-40.
7Predergast, Candice. "The Provision of Incentives in Firms", Journal of Economic Literature, 1999,37(March), 7-63.
8Rasmusen, Eric. "Moral Hazard in Risk-averse Teams", Rand Journal of Economics, 1987, 18,428-435.
9Ramakrishnan, R T S and A V Thakor. "Cooperation versus Competition in Agency", Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 1991, 7, 248-283.
10Schmidt, Klaus and M Schnitzer. "The Interaction of Implicit and Explicit Contracts", Economics Letters, 1995, 48, 193-199.
