利用类型推理验证Ad Hoc安全路由协议

Verifying Mobile Ad-Hoc Security Routing Protocols with Type Inference

提出一种基于类型推理的移动Ad-Hoc网络安全路由协议的形式化验证方法.定义了一种邻域限制通信演算NCCC(neighborhood-constrained communication calculus),包括演算的语法和基于规约的操作语义,在类型系统中描述了移动Ad-Hoc网络路由协议的安全属性,定义了近似攻击消息集用以精简Dolev-Yao攻击模型.还给出了该方法的一个协议验证实例.基于类型推理,该方法不仅能够验证协议的安全性,也可以得出针对协议的攻击手段.因为攻击集的精简,有效地缩减了推理空间.

A type-inference-based formal method is proposed for verifying an ad-hoc security routing protocol in this paper. A calculus, called NCCC （neighborhood-constraint communication calculus）, is defined to specify the protocol. The security property of the protocol is described with typing rules in a type system. Based on the Dolev-Yao model, an attacker model, called the message set of protocol format, is refined. At last, the simplified version of SAODV （secure ad hoc on-demand routing protocol） is verified with this method. With the typeinference-based formal method, not only is the security of protocols verified, but also the attacke examples are predicted. The complexity of inference is reduced significantly for refining the message set of protocol.