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金融危机下的存款保险建设 被引量:1

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摘要 在国际金融危机席卷全球的今天,为维护金融稳定,我国的显性存款保险制度即将出台。而中国的显性存款保险制度之所以十余年来久议未行,其深层次原因是经济中普遍存在的信息不对称。本文分析了信息不对称在存款保险体系中所导致的逆向选择和道德风险问题,并提出缓解方案,理性剖析显性存款保险制度的出台。
作者 吴军
出处 《当代经济》 2009年第17期146-147,共2页 Contemporary Economics
基金 上海大学人文社会科学研究发展基金资助 项目号:A.10-0115-08-401
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