非互惠接入定价、F-M模式与电信网络竞争：解释及政策含义

Non-reciprocal Access Pricing,F-M Model and Telecom Network Competition:Explanation and Policy Implications

中国电信市场的分业经营以及接入价格的强制性非对称管制导致移动对固定网络的替代越来越显著。传统的纯网络竞争模型在处理F-M模式下的网络竞争时具有良好的借鉴意义。基于中国的实践,对传统的LRT模型进行扩展,以适合对中国的分析。通过分析发现,在非互惠接入定价下,F-M模式下的网络竞争对固定网络的影响是不利的,解决这一问题的方法是实现固定与移动网络的融合,进而促进中国电信市场的全业务竞争。

The separated operation of Chinese telecom market and the compulsory and asymmetric management of access pricing lead to more and more substitution of mobile network for fixed network. Traditional pure network competition model provides reference meaning in dealing with network competition under F - M model. Based on the practice in China, the authors extend the traditional LRT model to make it suitable for the analysis in China. The authors find that under the non -reciprocal access pricing, network competition under F -M model has bad influence on the fixed network. The way to solve the problem is to realize the combination of fixed network and mobile network, and this will promote the full service competition of China＇ s telecom market.