摘要
本文首先分析了高管薪酬管制的原因,然后通过沪市上市国有企业的数据实证检验我国高管薪酬管制的有效性,实证结果显示由于薪酬管制的存在,导致在职消费和腐败现象的滋生,企业代理成本的增加最终影响到企业的绩效。
This paper first analyzes the reasons for the control of executives pay, and then useShanghailisted state-owned enterprises data on the effectivenes of controls executive pay, empirical results show that the presence of control due to the pay-the-job consumption and lead to corruption breeding, the increase in corporate agency costs. Ultimately affect the performance of the enterprise
出处
《经济管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2009年第10期87-93,共7页
Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )
关键词
薪酬管制
有效性
在职消费
pay Control
effectivenes
pay-the-job consumption
