摘要
以"强资本弱劳工"为特征的劳动力市场结构失衡,需要有来自政府和其他非市场因素的制衡作用。由劳动行政部门实施的劳动监察就是这种制衡作用的表现。那么,在市场转型期的中国,劳动部门是否能有效承担起劳动监察职能?其他治理主体又扮演何种角色?研究发现,在市场转型和失业危机并存的背景下,中国劳动监察体制很可能在面临规制危机的同时也遭遇合法化危机。缺乏多元参与,使得作为社会对话的劳动监察难以出现;反过来,利益相关者缺乏表达途径也限制着国家触角可以抵达的范围,这是中国劳动监察遭受高成本困扰的根本原因。
Based on the publicly published documents and information collected from the field survey,this article is carrying out a descriptive research on the labor inspection regime in China on the perspective of Social Regulation. We examine two important parts of labor inspection—the regulator and regulation process. The basic conclusion is: under the background of economic reform and unemployment crisis,as a kind of close and exclusive administration,labor inspection in China is likely to face the regulation crisis as well as crisis of legalism. Labor inspection as a kind of social conversation can hardly emerge due to the lack of pluralistic participation;instead,lacking in ways for stake-holders to voice,the scope that state can affect is also limited. This is the fundamental reason why labor inspection in China suffers high cost. Only by transferring from government-dominated regulation to plural-participative governance in which the government,market and society complement and balance with each other,and by building up a kind of labor inspection as social conversation,can the increasing social expectation of plural-stakeholders be satisfied,the aberrant ab-institutionalized and ab-legalized behaviors be diminished,the cost of social governance be virtually reduced,and the harmonious labor relationship be constructed.
出处
《公共行政评论》
2009年第5期92-120,共29页
Journal of Public Administration
基金
中山大学“985工程”二期公共管理与社会发展研究创新基地专项基金
中山大学“211工程”三期行政改革与政府治理研究项目
关键词
劳动监察体制
治理
制度建设
Labor Inspection Regime,Regulation,Institution-Building