摘要
股权分置改革后,定向增发作为全流通形式下的一种新的再融资方式,自2006年5月7日被中国资本市场引入以来就受到了上市公司的热烈欢迎。然而,两三年过去了,中国资本市场到底有没有实现证监会引入定向增发的初衷,发挥了预期的作用呢?投资者对定向增发的态度又如何呢?本文的研究发现,针对不同发行对象的定向增发有不同的宣告效应——当增发给法人股东、基金公司等非关联股东时,没有观察到明显的市场反应;而当增发的对象是控股股东、实际控制人等关联股东时,市场会有一个明显的负面的反应。为什么市场对不同的发行对象会有如此不同的反应?我们认为控股股东对利用各种自身便利对上市公司的利益进行输送,即"掏空"上市公司的行为导致了其负面的市场反应,我们以驰宏锌锗为例对这一假设进行了验证。本文的实证结果说明,定向增发机制引入后并没有很好地达到预期的效果,而且可能是为控股股东"掏空"上市公司提供了一个新的渠道,从而对监管者关于中小投资者保护制度的建设提出了严峻的挑战。
After the stock split reform, as a new kind of re-financing for tradable shares, private placement is greatly embraced by listed companies since the introduction into china's capital market in May, 2006.Several years has passed, has the domestic capital market achieved the intention of CSRC? Has private placement played a positive effect? What's the attitude of investors toward private placement? This study found that for different orientation of the issuing objects, private placement declaration has different effects, positive or negative.And why the phenomenon happened? We believe that the controlling shareholders take advantage of authority to make a tunnel, which has led to the negative market reaction.We will take Chihong Zinc and Germanium as an example to verify this hypothesis.The empirical results show private placement has not achieved the intention very well, but proving a tunnel for controlling shareholders to get extra benefits.More rigid regulation is needed for the protection of small investors.
