第一大股东持股与高层管理人员变更:区间效应的实证研究

The Impact of the Controlling Shareholder on Top Management Turnover:Evidence from the Listed Companies in China

本文以2006年上海证券交易所808家上市公司为样本,实证考察第一大股东持股对高管变更的影响。实证结果表明,公司绩效较好的情况下,第一大股东持股比例与公司高层管理人员变更之间存在显著的U型相关关系,在第一大股东持股较分散的区间,第一大股东持股对更换高管人员具有消极作用,在第一大股东持股集中的区间,第一大股东持股则具有积极的监督约束管理者功能;在不同的第一大股东持股区间,均不能验证第一大股东持股对经营不善公司管理层更换的积极作用。研究结果同时验证了股权制衡的监督制衡作用,其他大股东的持股与更换管理层呈现显著的正相关关系,而股权的国有性质与高管变更未呈现显著的相关关系。实证结果还表明,董事长和总经理两职兼任与高管变更负相关,独立董事制度对高管变更的影响不能发挥其正面监督作用。

This paper examines the relation between controlling shareholder and top management turnover of listed companies in Shanghai Stock Exchange in 2006. For excluding the impact of performance, we divided the whole sample companies into two groups： ordinary companies and special treatment companies. Our empirical results show that the largest shareholder has the negative and positive effects in different region of equity ownership, that is, we find a U-shaped relation between the largest shareholding＇s equity ownership and top management turnover. When the largest equity ownership is less than 37 percent of the whole share, the probability to change top management falls with the increase of the equity ownership of the largest shareholders, and when the proportion adds to 37 percent, the probability to change top executives increases. We also find that the equity ownership of other block shareholders is significantly positively related to the turnover of management.