上市公司信息披露的博弈分析

A Game Analysis of Public Company Information Disclosure

本文首先从上市公司的囚徒博弈模型出发进行分析,得出上市公司不完全披露公司信息的结论;然后分别讨论了加入社会舆论要素,双方对于社会舆论的主观评价具有不同的支付权重,从而使原来的对称博弈变为非对称博弈,各公司对于是否完全披露信息产生成本差异;以及加入声誉度依赖机制,囚徒双方为对方支付赋予一定权重,于是又转化为对方支付型的又一博弈形式;最后又在行业自律监管条件的博弈分析中,涉及道德的因素分析,得出在一定背景下双方选择完全公布公司信息的概率变大,进而走出囚徒困境。

This article starts its analysis of the prisoner game model of listed companies and comes to the conclusion that listed companies do not give full information discloure. Then it discusses other different circumstances and finds that when the element of public opinion is added, the two sides will pay different weights on the subjective evaluation of public opinion. As a result, the original symmetry game changes into an asymmetric one, and the cost difference on whether full disclosure of information should be provided crop up with the different companies. And when the mechanism of the reputation dependence is added, both prisoners give a certain weight on each other＇s pay-becoming another the other paid-Game. And finally, this paper involves the moral element into the industry self-regulation game analysis and reaches the conclusion that in certain context the two sides have a larger probability to choose to announce full company information and thus go out of the Prisoner＇s dilemma.