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中国农业上市公司债务融资效率比较研究 被引量:9

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摘要 本文采用面板数据随机影响变截距模型探讨我国农业上市公司的债务融资效率问题,从总体和结构两个层面对农业上市公司的债务融资代理成本进行分类研究和动态比较研究。研究发现,1999年前后农业类上市公司的代理成本变化存在显著差异。1999年前,总体上农业上市公司的代理成本与债务融资杠杆比率显著正相关;1999年后,其代理成本随杠杆比率增加幅度有递减趋势,弹性逐渐变小。从结构分析来看,农业类上市公司代理成本变化主要源于国有控股公司代理费用变化所致,而社会控股公司的代理成本稳中趋降,且弹性较小,由此说明国家宏观调控与监管效应日益发挥作用,但西方的杠杆治理在中国仍失效。2005年后国有控股农业上市公司的代理成本出现较大幅度下降趋势,可能源于股权分置改革消除了我国资本市场融资的制度障碍,有利于降低融资成本和减小代理成本。
作者 田满文
出处 《农业经济问题》 CSSCI 北大核心 2009年第9期75-82,共8页 Issues in Agricultural Economy
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参考文献16

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二级参考文献114

  • 1张仁德,韩晶.国有经济腐败的委托代理因素分析[J].当代经济科学,2003,25(2):28-32. 被引量:24
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