中小企业融资问题研究

Research on SME Financing

中小企业融资困难并不是现在才有的问题,也不是我国独有的问题。按现代金融理论的解释,中小企业融资的最大特点是"信息不对称",由此带来信贷市场的"逆向选择"和"道德风险"。商业银行为降低"道德风险",必须加大审查监督的力度,而中小企业贷款"少、急、频"的特点使商业银行的审查监督成本和潜在收益不对称,降低了它们在中小企业贷款方面的积极性。

Financing difficulties of SMEs are not preset problems,and unique ones in our country.According to the interpretation of modern finance theory,most prominent feature of SME financing is ＂asymmetric information＂,which result in ＂adverse selection＂ and ＂moral hazard＂ in credit markets.The commercial banks have to strengthen supervision to reduce the ＂moral hazard＂.However,the ＂less,urgent and frequent＂ feature of small business loan makes the examination and supervision costs of commercial banks and potential benefits appear asymmetric and reduce their initiative in SME lending.