土地财政与耕地保护——基于省际面板数据的因果关系分析

Land Fiscalization and Cultivated Land Protection:Causal Relationship Based on Provincial Panel Data Analysis

论文利用1999—2006年我国31个省(直辖市、自治区,因资料所限,不包括台湾省及香港和澳门地区)的面板数据,采用格兰杰因果关系检验、普通最小二乘法、固定效应模型、随机效应模型和动态面板数据模型广义矩等来分析我国土地财政对耕地数量变化的影响。研究结果表明:①土地财政与耕地数量之间存在相互反馈作用;②土地财政是导致我国耕地数量减少的重要原因,其影响的弹性系数为-0.01;③土地财政对耕地保护具有正反两方面作用:一方面,土地财政刺激地方政府形成城市扩张冲动,导致耕地数量减少;另一方面,土地财政带来土地开发整理增加耕地面积的大幅增加,降低耕地减少速度;④经济、人口和城镇化等社会经济因素也是导致我国耕地数量减少的重要原因。

With rapid growth of economy, urbanization and industrialization, China＇ s cultivated land decreased 793 × 10^4 hm^2 from 1998 to 2008. Recent studies indicate land fiscalization is one of the important reasons for land decrease. The purpose of this study is to explore the relationship between land fiscalization and cultivated land change. Methods of Granger causality test, OLS, fixed effect model, random effect model and GMM model were used, based on all China provinces＇ panel data of cultivated land area, land fiscalization, GDP, population and urbanization level from 1999 to 2006. The Granger causality test result shows cultivated land and land fiscalization have mutual feedback effects. Empirical analysis reveals that land fisealiztion is an important reason for cultivated land decrease, 1 percentage increase in land fisealiztion would cause 0.01 percentage decrease of cultivated land. Land fiscaliztion has two opposite impacts on cultivated land. On the one hand, land fiscaliztion could induce local governments to expand cultivated land occupation in pursuit of fiscal revenue growth and economic development. On the other hand, benefited from the land fiscaliztion growth, more capital investment in land consolidation could reduce land decrease rate.