微观治理、地区环境与控股股东的掏空行为

Corporate Governance, Local Envirnoment, and the Tunneling Behavior of Controlling Shareholders

本文讨论了区域环境影响下的企业微观层面的治理对控股股东侵占行为的制约作用。研究发现:企业微观层面的治理和区域环境都能够制约控股股东的侵占行为,但是企业微观治理的制约效应在环境较差的地区显著变弱。本文的建议是,要提高上市公司质量,保护中小投资者,必须首先完善上市公司面临的环境。

This paper discusses the relationship between the firm-level corporate governance and the tunneling behavior of controlling shareholders with the consideration of local envirnoment. I find that： Better firm-level corporate governance and better envirnment are highly correlated with less tunneling behavior of controlling shareholder, and firm-level corporate governance matters less in region with bad environments. I argue that the most important thing now in Chinese stock market is to reinforce the environment the corporations are facing.