股权制衡、法律保护与股改对价

Power Balance with Shareholder Structure, Legal Protection and Compensation Payment

本文利用股改公司的样本数据,检验了股权制衡与股改对价的关系以及法律保护机制对此的影响,结果发现:投资者对股权制衡型的公司会要求较低的对价水平,且股权制衡程度越大,对价水平越低;然而,这种负相关关系仅在公司所处地区法律保护程度较高时成立;这表明法律保护机制是影响股权制衡能否发挥积极作用的关键因素之一。

The relationships between power balance with shareholder structure and compensation payment, which legal protection affects, are analyzed by sample data of Chinese listed firms with non-tradable shares reform. Evidences show that listed firms with power balance with shareholder structure will be required for low compensation ratio and the more power balance, the lower compensation ratio. Meanwhile, their negative correlation is only significant for listed firms located in the districts of high legal protection, which means that whether power balance with shareholder structure improve corporate governance be affected by the level of legal protection.