低赔期与保险契约——传统部分保险契约的一个帕累托改进

Insurance contract and low compensation time——Pareto improvement of traditional partial insurance contract

逆向选择严重影响着保险市场的交易效率,至今没有得到圆满彻底的解决.在旧车市场上试用期对旧车质量具有甄别功能的提示下,分别就投保人为两种和两种以上风险类型加以讨论,建立了相应的带低赔期的保险契约模型.首次提出可以用低赔期来甄别投保人的风险类型.带低赔期的保险合同是指投保人在签约初的一定时长内,如果投保人发生风险,则保险公司予以较低赔偿;如果顺利渡过该时长,则一直到保险期末,保险公司通过给付事后补偿金的方式提供一个较高效用的完全保险合同.在低赔期一样条件下,由于高风险的投保人接受该保险合同时获得较低赔偿的概率较大,顺利渡过低赔期从而获得一个较高效用的完全保险合同的概率较小,失去了效仿低风险类型投保人的积极性,最终退出这类交易合同.以一个算例说明确实存在带低赔期的保险合同是传统部分保险合同帕累托改进的情况.

Adverse selection has a serious effect upon the exchange efficiency of the insurance market, this has not been solved completely until now. As a trial can screen the quality of old cars in second hand car market, in this paper we discuss insurers of two and more risk types with respect to a policy holder action. An insurance contract model with low initial compensation is established. It puts forward that this low compensation period can be used to screen policy holders＇ risk types. Insurance contracts with low compensation time means that during the start of the signing the contract, if the policy holder runs into risk, the insurance company will give low compensation. On the other hand, if no claims are made during this period, then, until the end of the insured time, the insurance company will provide a fully insured contract. In this condition of partial insurance, it is shown that during the low compensation period the probability of obtaining low compensation is larger if a high risk policy holder accepts the insurance contract and vice versa. This results in high risk policy holders tending to give up the contract. An example is given to show this condition existed in reality and we demonstrate a Pareto improvement to the traditional partial insurance contract.