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医疗领域的政府干预与声誉机制 被引量:4

Government Intervention and Rectification of Reputation Mechanism in Health Care Reform
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摘要 不确定性和信息不对称常常被认为是医疗市场失灵和政府干预的依据,政府的过度干预又会导致医疗声誉机制的扭曲。改革现行"管办不分"的医疗卫生体制,由市场声誉取代政府行政干预,通过重复博弈建立医生与患者之间的长期稳定的关系,解决医疗卫生领域的难题。 Health care failures are necessary but not sufficient conditions for government intervention. Excessive government intervention will lead to distortion in the medical reputation mechanism. In order to establish a long-term and stable relationship between doctors and patients, rectify the reputation mechanism in health care and resolve the issues of difficulty and high expense in seeing a doctor, it is urgent to reform the current medical and health system in which supervisors are, at the same time, service suppliers.
出处 《当代经济管理》 2009年第10期56-59,共4页 Contemporary Economic Management
基金 赵曼教授主持的国家自然科学基金资助项目<监管 自律与医生道德风险规避>(70673114)的阶段性研究成果
关键词 市场失灵 政府干预 声誉机制 重复博弈 market failure government intervention reputation mechanism repeated games
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