基于不同权力结构的废旧产品回收再制造决策分析

Decision Analysis on Collection and Remanufacturing of Used Products Based on Different Power Structures

本文研究了制造商主导、回收商主导、垂直纳什均衡以及集中式决策四种不同权力结构下的废旧产品回收再制造问题,给出并比较了四种结构下决策变量的最优解。研究表明:与集中式决策相比,三种分散式情形下的系统效益非最优;垂直纳什均衡时的系统效益严格优于制造商主导时;当回收商主导逆向供应链时,在某些条件下能够达到集中式决策的水平;相反,制造商主导和垂直纳什均衡时则无法达到。对制造商主导和回收商主导两种情形,利用费用共享契约和二部定价契约进行了协调。

This paper studies decision-making on collection and remanufacturing of used products with four different power structures, including Manufacturer-leading, Collector-leading, Vertical Nash equilibrium and Centralized decision. The optimal solutions of decision variables are given and compared among these four power structures. The research shows that the system benefits under three decentralized cases are not optimal, compared with centralized decision. The system benefit under Vertical Nash equilibrium is strictly super to that of Manufacturer-leading. When the collector leads in the reverse supply chain, the system benefits can achieve the level of the centralized decision in some conditions. In contrast, in the cases of Manufacturer-leading and Vertical Nash equilibrium, the system benefits can never achieve it. Expense sharing contract and two-tariff contract are used to coordinate the reverse supply chain under the structure of Manufacturer-leading and Collector-leading, respectively.