网络“柠檬”环境下消费者行为与抵消机制——基于信息经济学的视角被引量：21

E-Consumer's Behavior and Counteracting Mechanism under the Cyber "Lemon":from the Perspective of Information Economics

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摘要 "柠檬"问题说明了市场中质量信息的不对称性对交易效率的负影响,它是由2001年诺贝尔经济学奖得主、信息经济学家乔治·阿克洛夫(George A. Akerlof)提出的。本文所构建的网络"柠檬"环境下消费者行为模型,基于对Akerlof经典模型的改进与扩展:充分考虑了网络交易中买卖双方对产品质量偏好的差异,并考虑在线产品连续质量分布对市场均衡所产生的影响,以揭示出网络市场"柠檬"问题不同于实物市场的特性及其对消费者行为的影响。本文还基于淘宝网的数据,利用计量经济学模型,实证性地探讨了信用评价系统等抵消机制在抵消"柠檬"现象时的作用,对存在的问题进行了分析并提出策略建议。 The ＇lemon＇ problem shows the negative impact of transaction efficiency that results from quality-information asymmetries. It was pointed out in 2001 by American economist George Akerlof （1970）, a Nobel Economics Prize laureate. Based on Akedof＇s ＇lemon＇ model, this paper builds an e-consumer＇s behavior model under the eyber ＇lemon＇. This model fully considers the difference between e-trader＇s quality- preference and the influence of continuous quality distribution on the market equilibrium in order to reveal the characteristics of ＂lemon＂ problem different from the physical market and its impact on consumer behavior. Based on the data from taobao.eom, this paper sets up an econometric model and demonstratively analyzes the function of quality-intermediary, credit evaluation system and reputation to counteract the ＇lemons＇ problem, and discusses existing issues.

作者潘勇

机构地区河南财经学院物流与电子商务系

出处《管理评论》 CSSCI 北大核心 2009年第10期41-51,共11页 Management Review

基金教育部人文社会科学研究2007年度规划基金项目资助(07JA630021)

关键词信息的非对称性 “柠檬”问题逆向选择质量中介 informational asymmetry, ＇lemon＇ problem, adverse selection, quality-intermediary

分类号 F062.5 [经济管理—政治经济学]

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参考文献36

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