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考虑质量失误的建筑供应链质量控制协调研究 被引量:10

Research on Quality Control Coordination in Construction Supply Chain Considering Quality Failure
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摘要 考虑内外部质量损失条件下,研究由分包商和总包商组成的两级建筑供应链中的质量控制博弈问题。根据典型的建设工程施工质量控制流程,建立了建筑供应链的三层质量控制树。基于质量控制树分别建立了集中决策条件下和协调决策条件下的收益函数模型。通过对模型求解结果的对比分析,得出在双方共同原因导致的内部质量损失由双方分摊的情况下,双方共同分担外部质量损失可使供应链质量控制决策达到协调。进一步的分析得出,内外部质量损失比率越大,总包商所承担的内部质量损失比例越大,而分担的外部质量损失比例越小。 The quality control game between the subcontractor and the general contractor which constitutes the two-echelon construction supply chain is studied in view of internal and external failure. According to the process of typical construction quality, the three-layer quality control "tree" is established. The models of quality revenue function of the subcontractor and the general contractor are built under centralized decision and decentralized coordination decision based on the quality control "tree". It can be contrasted and analyzed from the solutions of the models that the quality control decision of supply chain can be coordinated when the external quality failure caused by the general contractor and subcontractor, is allocated by both, in the event that the internal quality failure caused by the general contractor and subcontractor, is allocated by both. For further analysis, we can conclude that the larger the ratio of internal quality loss to external quality loss is, the larger the allocation rate of the general contractor bearing the internal quality loss, while the smaller the allocation rate of the general contractor bearing the external quality loss.
出处 《运筹与管理》 CSCD 北大核心 2009年第5期91-96,共6页 Operations Research and Management Science
基金 国家自然科学基金资助项目(10801110) 陕西省教育厅科研计划资助项目(071C081)
关键词 建筑供应链 质量控制 博弈 协调 construction supply chain quality control game coordination
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