企业年金市场进入规制研究

Regulation on entry to the corporate annuity market

本文从质量和数量两个维度考察中国企业年金市场进入规制。质量规制目标明确,最低资质标准能够保证企业年金基金管理机构的底线质量,但受评审专家与金融机构之间信息不对称干扰,资格认定机制无法保证经营牌照发放给真正优秀的金融机构。资格认定机制也是数量规制措施,监管当局缺乏对企业年金市场合理市场结构的明确判断,政策的摇摆导致早期企业年金市场恶性价格竞争,未来垄断合谋的可能性增强。

The minimum competency standard and licensing, which composes the entry nuity market in China, were reviewed from quality and quantity dimensionalities in this regulation of corporate an- paper. The quality regula- tion had a clear objective, aiming to ensure minimum quality requirements of the corporate annuity funds manage- ment institutions through imposing the minimum competency standard. The licensing mechanism could not ensure to issue the license to the real excellent institutions because of the information asymmetry between the experts and the institutions. The licensing mechanism was also a quantity control regulation. The regulation authority lacked under- standing on the acceptable corporate annuity market structure. Its policy sways resulted in the price war in the mar- ket at the early stage, and a greater possibility of monopoly and collusion in the future.