摘要
本文在Salant古诺模型的基础上尝试建立了一个新的模型来分析横向兼并对企业利润、市场价格和社会福利的影响。但是,与Salant模型不同的是,本文不再假定企业在兼并前后始终保持古诺竞争策略,而是假定当兼并发生之后新企业采取的是斯塔伯格竞争策略,而未参与兼并的企业仍然采用古诺竞争策略。结果表明:参与兼并的企业存在很强的兼并动机,而且对于企业而言有利可图的横向兼并在一定条件下可以降低市场价格,也有利于消费者福利和社会总福利的增长。
This paper analyzes horizontal mergers in Salant Cournot oligopoly model and the effect of mergers on profits, market price and social welfare. However, different from Salant model, I do not restrict all firms to remain the Cournot strategies before and after the merger, but allow the new merged group a Stackelberg leader and the unmerged firms remain Cournot after the merger. We conclude that there are strong incentives for the merged firms to take such horizontal merger which is profitable for them, and find some conditions under which such mergers would decrease market price and raise the consumer welfare and social welfare.
出处
《南京财经大学学报》
2009年第4期1-5,共5页
Journal of Nanjing University of Finance and Economics
关键词
横向兼并
古诺竞争
斯塔伯格竞争
horizontal merger
Cournot competition
Stackelberg competition