现金流量操纵、债权保护与债务违约率——来自中国证券市场的证据

Cash Flow Management、Creditor Protection and Debt Default Rates

检验企业的现金流量操纵行为是否导致了更高的债务违约率,可以考察中国银行业能否识别企业现金流量操纵的经济后果这一关键问题。以1999-2007年的中国上市公司为研究样本,运用单变量比较和多元回归分析可以发现,微正企业的债务违约率与其左边相邻公司没有显著差异,但显著大于其右边相邻公司,这表明现金流量操纵企业的债务违约率相对更高,中国银行业不能有效识别企业的会计操纵行为,这些行为导致银行资源的不合理配置和不良债权的发生。

Studying whether Chinese companies＇ cash flow management behaviors lead to higher loan default rates, we can investigate whether the economic consequences for Chinese banks discern companies＇ cash flow management behaviors. Taking these listed companies since 1999 to 2001, as study samples, using the single variable comparison and multivariate analysis, we can find that the loan default rates of these suspected companies does not have significant differences with left adjacent interval companies but significant larger than that of fight adjacent interval companies. It manifests that companies existing the cash flow management have higher loan default rate, and Chinese banks can not effectively discern companies＇ manipulating behaviors, which can bring unreasonable resource allocation and non-performing loans.