政府投资期权监管中的激励与审核机制研究

The Research on Incentives and Audit Mechanisms in Government's Options Investment Supervision

文章针对投资期权执行中的逆向选择问题提供了一个以最优契约为基础的审核机制,该机制由于加入内生惩罚约束而更加符合实际。重点分析了审核机制对投资期权执行效率的影响以及对激励机制的替代作用,这种替代作用表现为在投资执行效率方面的完全替代和在信息租金方面的部分替代。由于审核机制具有一定的期权特征,使得最优审核机制具有一定的复杂性,文章采用数值模拟的方法进行了比较静态分析。最后以政府实施项目监管和审核机制为背景,提供了一个以股票价格为信号的投资期权审核机制的应用,为政府构建有效的项目投资监管机制提供政策建议。

Based on literature, this paper provides an audit mechanism with the optimal contract, which focuses on the adverse selection problem in the options investment. This mechanism is practical due to the endogenous punishment. The effects of the mechanism on both the efficiency of options investment and on the substitution of the incentive mechanism are analyzed. These substitution effects involve two aspects： the complete substitution to efficiency of investment exercising and the partial substitution to information rents. Due to the options characteristics of the audit mechanism, the optimal audit mechanism is complex. The numerical simulation method is adopted to analyze it. Finally, based on the background of government＇s project auditing and supervising, this paper analyzes the application of investment options audit mechanism based on the signal of stock price in order to provide some suggestions for the government to build a effective supervising mechanism of the project investment.