基于信号传递模型的创业投资过程控制权配置

Arrangement of Control Right for Venture Capital Based on Signaling Model

创业投资过程中控制权的有效配置是决定创业投资能否成功的关键内容。在创业投资过程中,创业投资家常常获得相对于其股权比例而言更大的控制权,现有企业理论中"所有权必须与控制权相匹配"的原则,并不能很好地解释创业企业中的这一现象。从控制权配置的信号传递及信息甄别机制的角度研究创业企业控制权非对称配置问题,并得出了以控制权为信号达到分离均衡的模型。

The arrangement of control right is an important part for the venture capital success. This paper studies the asymmetric phenomenon of control fight arrangement in venture investment. The investor often gets more control right than it should get by his stock sharing. By using signaling and screening model, this paper gives an analysis the asymmetric phenomenon of control fight arrangement and gets the conditions to reach separating equilibrium.