无对象表象悖论与胡塞尔意向性理论的产生

The Paradox of Objectless Representations and the Forming of Husserl's Theory of Intentionality

无对象表象悖论由两个对立的命题构成:"每个表象都表象一个对象"——"并非每个表象都有对象"。这个悖论是意向性理论必然要面对的问题。本文试图通过介绍胡塞尔在1894年所作的《意向的对象》一文对这个悖论的思考来展示其意向性理论的产生以及他当时所持的一种二阶性的本体论立场。

The paradox of objectless representations is made up of two propositions. ＂Each representation represents an object＂ —— ＂Each representation does not correspond to an object＂. This paradox causes the difficulty which the theory of intentionality cannot but face up to. This essay tries to introduce Husserl＇s thinking about the paradox in the article ＂Intentionale Gegenstand＂ in 1894,and to show how his theory of Intentionality was formed and an ontology of double order objects he held.