期刊文献+

康德关于直观和概念的区分 被引量:2

Kant's Distinction between Intuition and Concept
下载PDF
导出
摘要 直观和概念是两种不同的先天认识形式。二者截然不同,但惟有结合起来才形成知识,由此给康德的认识论带来了难题。康德对二者的区分实际上是对西方哲学史上关于感觉和理智的区分的一种自觉继承,但采取了一种新的形式。完整理解这两个概念及其关系,对于深刻把握康德在认识论上的变革及其理论困境是十分必要的。 Intuition and Concept are distinguished two different forms of a priori cognition by Kant in his Critique of Pure reason. According to Kant, we receive the object through the former, and we think the object through the latter. On the one hand, Kant insists on distinguishing them strictly, and on the other, he insists that the combination of intuition and concept is needed in cognition process, As a result he wrestles with the question on the theory. The distinction of intuition and concept naturally inherits the distinction between sense and understanding of the history of western philosophy, but Kant proposed a new form. It is absolutely necessary for us to have an overall understanding of the two concepts, so as to understand the reformation and difficulties of Kant in epistemology deeply.
作者 潘卫红
出处 《北方论丛》 CSSCI 北大核心 2009年第6期116-119,共4页 The Northern Forum
关键词 直观 概念 感觉 理智 想象力 Intuition Concept Sense Understanding Imagination
  • 相关文献

参考文献6

  • 1康德.纯粹理性批判[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,2004.250,251.
  • 2洛克.人类理智论(上册)[M].关文运译.北京:商务印书馆,1997.
  • 3笛卡尔.第一哲学沉思集[M].北京:商务印书馆,1996..
  • 4莱布尼茨.人类理智新论(上册)[M].陈修斋译.北京:商务印书馆,1996.
  • 5Martin Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics [ M ]. Translat- ed by Richard Taft, Indiana University Press, 1990.
  • 6Sarah L. Gibbons, Kant' s Theory of Imagination : Bridging Gaps in Judgement and Experience[ M]. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994.

共引文献48

同被引文献13

引证文献2

二级引证文献4

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部