地方政府联动治理农业面源污染的行为博弈

Game Analysis of Local Governments with Joint Governance in Agriculturl Non-Point Pollution

农村面源污染的污染源分散,污染过程复杂,危害后果广泛,治理难度大。所以,它的治理始终是各级政府最为关注的问题。在政府分权改革进程中,地方政府成为相对独立的经济利益主体,自然成为农村环境保护的责任主体。目前国内外的学者多集中研究地方政府如何治理本地区的农村环境问题,对于各级地方政府联合治理污染的研究多集中在流域污染的治理。从地方政府综合效用视角分析地方政府联合治理农村面源污染的研究还鲜有所见。通过地方政府在治理农村面源污染的行为特征分析,运用博弈论方法导出农村面源污染的有效治理必须是各级地方政府联动,准确确定地方政府联动治理的范围,达成联动治理的集体决定,建立维持机制。

Rural non - point source pollution has the characters of dispersion, complicated process, dangerous consequences of a wide range. Still, it is difficult for the government to treat. Therefore, the governments always concern mueh about it. In decentralization reform process, local governments turn to relatively independent economic subjects. They naturally become the main responsible subjects for environmental protection in rural areas. Many scholars at home and abroad focus on how local governments settle rural environment problems. Local governments＇ cooperation in pollution control concentrated more in the watershed. However, there is little study from the perspective of comprehensive utility of local governments. The thesis analyzes the behavior of local government in the governance of rural non - point source pollution. Based on game theory, it puts up that the effective management of local governments at all levels must unit and make out the range of treatment. The governments should agree on the collective decision and set up the maintenance meehanism.