国有企业IPO发行折价：基于政策信号理论的解释

IPO Discount of State - owned Enterprises: Interpretation Based on the Theory of Policy Signaling

IPO发行折价是企业上市的一项重要融资成本。我们发现2002～2005年国有企业的IPO发行折价比非国有企业平均高出29.95%。已有文献大多从代理成本的角度解释这一现象,本文则从政策信号理论出发探讨其原因。政策信号理论认为,国有企业较高的IPO折价是政府在私有化进程中主动向市场投资者传递的政策信号,表明维护长期股权价值的政策主张。我们发现,国有企业中政府私有化意愿较弱的公司IPO折价较高;国有企业IPO发行折价与第一大股东持股比例、公司股权控制链的长度显著负相关,这些关系皆不存在于非国有企业;此外,国有企业,特别是政府私有化意愿较弱的公司,发行后长期股权回报显著高于其他企业。这些证据都与政策信号理论一致,而不能完全被代理理论解释。

IPO discount is an important part of equity financing cost. The authors find that IPO discounts of SOEs in China are on average 29.95% higher than those of non-SOE firms. Most existing studies suggest agency cost as the explanation for such phenomena, but few evidences are provided. Nevertheless, this paper attempts to test the policy signal theory as the explanation of the higher IPO discount of SOEs. The policy signal theory argues that the higher IPO discounts of SOEs are proactive behaviors of the state in the process of privati- zation, aiming to convey a policy signal to the market for maintaining firm value in the future. The authors also find that IPO discount of SOEs decreases significantly with the largest shareholding and the length of controlling chain, but there is no such pattern for non-SOE IPOs. Furthermore, SOEs, in particular SOEs with weaker privatization strategy, tend to have higher IPO discounts and long-term buy-and-hold abnormal returns than other firms. Overall, the evidences are consistent with predictions of the policy signal theory, and cannot be fully explained by the agency cost theory.