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董事会行为与公司业绩关系研究--一个理论框架及我国上市公司的实证检验 被引量:18

Behavior of the Board and Firm's Performance:A Theoretical Framework and Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies
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摘要 本文研究了董事会行为与公司业绩之间的关系。我们首先从董事会成员的能力、努力程度和董事会组织认同与和谐等三个方面提出了董事会行为与公司业绩相关性的逻辑框架。然后,利用我国沪市上市公司的数据对董事会行为与公司业绩之间的相关性进行了实证检验。研究结果表明,董事会成员的能力、努力程度与公司业绩正相关,董事会成员之间的和谐程度与公司业绩相关。这表明董事会行为确实影响着公司业绩,而且这种影响比起董事会结构与特征更为直接。 The external mechanisms of corporate governance include state regulations, accounting and auditing systems, capital market, competition mechanisms (i. e. HR, products, and control rights) and active block-holders (World Bank, 1999). Whatever the effectiveness of roles played by these mechanisms, the indisputable rationality is that the internal mechanism is of great importance to governance, especially the Board. Different from the previous research which paid heavy attentions on the structure of the Board, this paper focus on the Board behavior (the process or dynamics, BB), which was originally developed by Pfeffer (197.9) and Pfeffer & Salancik (1978), and try to re-think the relationship between the Board and firm's performance (P). By analyzing the three models on the Board (agency model. stewardship model and resource dependence model), we firstly demonstrate the logic framework of relevance of BB to P. where we define BB as the competence (ability to do something), diligence (of doing something) of each board member, and cohesiveness of the board. Then, by taking an empirical test of the relationship between the BB and P on the data (2005) of Shanghai Stock Exchange, we find that the competence and diligence are positively related to P, and the cohesiveness is negatively related to P. It is clearly addressed that BB have significant influence on performance, and this influence is much more directly than the structure and characteristics of the board on P.
作者 王斌 童盼
出处 《中国会计评论》 CSSCI 2008年第3期255-274,共20页 China Accounting Review
关键词 董事会结构 董事会行为 公司业绩 Structure of the Board, Behavior of the Board. Firm's Performance
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