企业家自有资本、“激励因子”对风险投资家的激励

Motivation of Entrepreneur's Self-owned Capital and Incentive Factors on Venture Capitalist

运用Stackelberg博弈模型讨论了企业家对风险投资家的激励问题,并对博弈双方的均衡投资决策进行分析。首先通过引入融资契约中常用的"激励因子",分别建立了风险投资家和企业家的支付函数以及Stackelberg博弈模型;然后通过逆向归纳法分析该模型,讨论了作为领导者的企业家的自有资本和"激励因子"对作为跟随者的风险投资家的总投资水平及资本结构的影响,在此基础上,分析了企业家的均衡投资决策,给出了企业家激励风险投资家提供风险资本的必要条件,从而解决了企业家对风险投资家的激励问题。通过研究发现:风险投资家的总投资水平由债权"激励因子"和其边际投资机会成本决定,而股权投资水平由其"激励因子"、主观收益率的参数以及绝对风险厌恶因子决定。尽管风险投资家较企业家风险厌恶,但是后者可以通过激励前者,使前者对于新创企业前景较自身乐观。

The entrepreneur always inspires the venture capitalist to provide venture capital through his own action before the contract between them forms. Based on the Stackelberg game model, this paper dis- cusses the stimulation imposed on venture capitalist by entrepreneur and analyses both sides＇ equilibrium investment decisions. Firstly, this paper introduces the incentive scheme from the financing contract and constructs a Stackelberg game. Then, we discuss how the own capital and incentive scheme of entrepre- neur who as the leader affect the total investment and capital structure of venture capitalist who as the fol- lower by adverse induction. Furthermore, it discusses the equilibrium investment decision of entrepreneur, thus resolves the incentive problem that entrepreneur towards venture capitalist. From the analyses, we conclude that the total investment is determined by the debt incentive scheme and marginal cost of venture capitalist; and the equity investment is determined by the risk aversion factor of venture capitalist, the pa- rameters of subjective rate and incentive scheme. Another interesting result is that since the capitalist assumed to be more risk averse than the entrepreneur, which makes the former more optimistic than the latter.