单个大股东控制与董事会结构模型

Control of Single Large Shareholder and Board Structure Model

基于大股东的"掏空"行为,本文构建单个大股东控制下的董事会结构模型。经过模型推导得到结论:在公司存在单个大股东的前提下,如果公司的大股东可以影响公司的董事会成员构成,那么出于自身利益的考虑,大股东将尽量多地安排自己选派的董事会成员,尽可能地减少非自己选派的董事会成员。同时,公司大股东的控制能力越强,这种趋势将表现得越明显。本文选取1999—2005年A股上市公司样本对模型的结论进行实证检验,实证结果证实了所建模型的正确性。

For depicting the board structure characteristics of the listed companies where the single largest shareholder exists in China,this paper builds a model,based on the occupation motivation of the large shareholder to small shareholders＇ benefits, i. e. the tunneling. From the model, we deduce that because of the occupation motivation, the largest shareholder can make use of some way to control the company＇s board of directors so that their actions, which include increasing the director whom they can control as far as possible and reducing the others,can be approved by directors without a hitch. The stronger the large shareholder＇s control is,the significant the above trend is.