改进型多态性密码的安全机制研究

Security Analysis of Mechanisms for the Improved Polymorphic Cipher

和大多数通常已知的对称性加密算法(包括AES的代表算法,例如Rijndael和Twofish)相比较,多态性密码可以抵御差分密码攻击。这种算法主要用于磁盘文件的加密。要解决的问题是在P2P网络中改进多态性密码机制,为通信双方提供大量安全的会话密钥。构造了满足严格雪崩准则和输出位独立性的强单向函数,并对其进行了安全性分析,用实验数据和相关理论进行了论证。

In contrast to most or all commonly known symmetric encryption algorithm designs （including the AES candidates such as Rijndael and Twofish） ,the Polymorphic Cipher （PMC） can immunize differential power attack. The algorithm is mostly used to encrypt disk files. The problem that would be solved is to improve the Polymorphic Cipher in P2P,and to provide mass-produced session keys for two parties across a communication channel. A strong one-way function satisfing the Strict Avalanche Criterion （SAC） was constructed. The security of the function was analyzed by some experimental results and correlated theories.