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股权分置改革、上市公司终极控制股东与投资者利益保护 被引量:3

Non-tradable Share Reform,Ultimate Controlling Right of Chinese Listed Companies and Investor Protection
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摘要 世界各国公司治理状况的不同,本质上可以归因于各国法律对投资者保护的差异。终极控制股东通过持有上市公司的终极控制权可以获取控制权的私有收益,而这是不利于中小投资者利益的。我国的股权分置状态放大了控制权的私有收益,在股权分置改革完成后,在现有法律体系下,终极控制股东对投资者利益的影响依然存在。 The corporate governance is difference in difference countries, it due in the difference of law to investor protection in the world. The ultimate controlling shareholders of listed companies can gain private benefits through owning the ultimate controlling right, this is worse to investor protection. The dualistic ownership structure enlarge these private benefits, after the non-tradable share reform, the influence of ultimate controlling shareholders to investor protection is not exit.
出处 《技术经济与管理研究》 北大核心 2009年第6期109-112,共4页 Journal of Technical Economics & Management
基金 国家自然科学基金(70602035) 国家社科基金(07XJY004) 教育部人文社科基金(06JC630022) 中国博士后基金(20070411162) 四川省哲学社会科学"十一五"规划项目(SC07C010) 西南交通大学"竢实之星"项目
关键词 终极控制权 股权分置改革 公司治理 投资者保护 Ultimate Controlling Rights Non-tradable Share Reform Corporate Governance Investor Protection
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参考文献12

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二级参考文献29

共引文献40

同被引文献47

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