政治收益、经济贿赂与经济绩效:一个新古典政治经济学模型

Political Gains,Economic Corruption and Economic Performance:a Model of New Classical Political Economy

目前研究政治对经济影响的大量文章都利用锦标赛模型分析官员激励如何影响经济绩效,但这些模型仅仅假设府官员只是追求政治晋升最大化,而且对经济领域的行为分析太少。我们通过将追求货币收入也纳入官员的目标函数,在构造了一个带约束的古诺模型的基础上,将官员政治激励嵌入其中,并以此分析了官员对自己精力和时间的分配如何对经济绩效产生影响。尽管我们没有利用应用锦标赛模型,但是本文的模型也可以解释大多数政治晋升现象,而且由于我们丰富了经济领域的行为人(企业)行为,从而可以解释更多的现象如官员的经济腐败、政府采购以及"高薪养廉"等。

The study of the economic impact of politics on a large number of articles have made use the model of political tournament to analysis how they affect economic performance incentives, but these models assume that government officials maximize the pursuit of political advancement only, and the analysis of economic field behavior is too simplistic. We will also add the economic corruption in the officials objective function, and construct a Cournot model with the constraint condition . After that, we embedded the political incentives in the model, and analysis the distribution of officials＇ time and energy how to impact on economic performance. While we do not have to use the political tournament model, but models of this article can also explain the phenomenon of the majority of political promotion, and because our enriched the act of economic fields （ enterprises）, more phenomenon can be explained, such as, official economic corruption, and government procurement and ＂Nourishing Honesty by High Salary＂ and so on.