非法资金流动行为及其博弈均衡研究——基于演化博弈的分析

Research on Illegal Behavior of Capital Flow and its Game Equilibrium——Based on Analysis of Evolutionary Game

运用演化博弈的方法对实施非法资本流动群体的行为和最终均衡分析结果显示,不能指望在对非法资本跨国流动行为的惩罚力度有限的加强之后,这种行为会马上得到抑制。对于监管当局来说,由于非法资本跨国流动的收益是无法控制的,所以为了尽量抑制这种行为,对实施者的惩罚力度应持续加强。而且这种惩罚威胁即使只作用于部分个体,也能有效遏制整体的非法资金流动。

With evolutionary game approach, the analysis of the group behavior of illegal capital flows and its final equilibrium can come to a conclusion that we can not expect that this behavior will soon be curtailed by strengthening the punishment with limited efforts for the cross-border flows of illegal capital. As for the supervisory authorities, the cross-border flows of illegal capital can not be controlled, so in order to try to curb such acts, the punishment for the perpetrators should continue to be strengthened. And even if the threat of such punishment only acts on the part of individuals, it will also be able to effectively curb the illegal financial flows as a whole.